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NOTES
PROHIBITING FOREIGN BRIBES: CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR
CORPORATE PAYMENTS ABROAD
One of the results of the Special Prosecutor's investigation of the
"Watergate Affair" was the uncovering of questionable corporate pay-
ments aboard.' Initially the practice appeared to be limited to a handful
of American multinational corporations, but in the past year admissions
of corporate misconduct have escalated to the point where over three
hundred firms have disclosed questionable domestic or foreign pay-
ments.2 The diverse nature of the recipients of foreign bribes3 and the
variety of motives for making the payoffs4 are also indicative of the
1. See, e.g., Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at .19, col. 3; TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 31, col. 1.
2. 123 CONG. REc. S7195 (daily ed. May 5, 1977); cf. 122 CONG. Ec. S15856 (daily ed.
Sept. 15, 1976); Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
3. The recipients of corporate payoffs fall into four general groups: foreign government
officials, lower level government employees, foreign political parties, and foreign business
enterprises. Of the 95 corporations examined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in their report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 54
admitted making payments to foreign officials, making this the most commonly reported
transaction. Seventeen disclosed foreign political contributions. Some of the other re-
ported payments are believed to have involved commercial bribery. SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE SECURIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES 37-39 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT]. "Grease" or
"facilitating" payments to government employees to induce them to perform their routine
functions may be the most common type of foreign bribe. See Letter from Elliot Richard-
son, Chairman of the President's Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments
Abroad, to Sen. William Proxmire, June 11, 1976, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Task Force
Letter] (reprinted in Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing on S. 3133, S. 3379,
and S. 3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes]).
4. The often overlapping motives for making foreign payments may be classified as
follows: (a) obtaining new business or maintaining existing business; (b) averting expro-
priation, nationalization, expulsion, or cancellation of existing rights (often termed "pre-
ventative maintenance"); (c) influencing administrative or legislative actions to establish
or preserve a favorable business climate; and (d) expediting the performance of routine
government services. To Require Certain Actions by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 40 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as House Hearings on OPIC] (testimony of Joseph Griffin, Chairman, ABA Comm. Insur-
ing Overseas Investments). See Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Payments: The Over-
seas Payment Problem, 8 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 547, 548-53 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
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pervasiveness of the practice. The gravity of the problem has been
widely recognized by United States officials, who have condemned for-
eign bribery as distorting trade and investment flows, eroding the gen-
eral reputation of the American business community, and damaging our
foreign relations.5
Particularly distrubing has been the discovery that in many instances
a member of corporate management was directly involved in the trans-
action Nevertheless, with the exception of several highly publicized
resignations, very few of the corporate officials involved have been fired,
demoted, or even transferred.' Furthermore, there are indications that
the recent disclosures and concomitant publicity are having only a lim-
ited impact on corporate conduct.8 Several firms have openly admitted
that they will continue to make certain payments when "necessary."'
This Note will focus on one possible remedy for the foreign payments
problem: the prohibition of bribery through criminal sanctions. The
scope of the analysis will be limited to the prohibition of payments to
foreign government officials and contributions to foreign political par-
Corporate Payments]; Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Payments, The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Report on Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations:
The Problem and Approaches to a Solution 2 (Mar. 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Bar of
the City of New York Report].
5. See, e.g., Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes] (statement of
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce); 122 CONG. Rzc. S15789 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1976) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
6. Forty-six of the ninety-five companies reporting foreign and domestic payments to
the SEC disclosed corporate management's knowledge of, approval of, or participation in
the questioned transaction. SEC Report, supra note 3, at 41. See Corporate Payments,
supra note 4, at 580 & n.188. A poll by the Opinion Research Corporation in July of 1975
revealed that almost one-half of the American executives surveyed saw nothing wrong with
bribing foreign officials to obtain sales. SEC REPoRT, supra note 3, at 41.
7. Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.). See Letter from Sen. Lee Metcalf,
Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal, Rep. Toby Moffett, Rep. Thomas Downey, Ralph Nader, and
Mark Green to Hon. Edward H. Levi, Aug. 22, 1975, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Metcalf
Letter]; Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 1 (comments
of Sen. William Proxmire).
8. Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.). Companies are clinging to foreign
sales agents although many have been implicated in the bribery disclosures. Raytheon Co.
continues to employ Adrion Khashoggi despite his alleged involvement in the Northrup
Corp. bribes. During his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Robert Haach, Chairman of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., repeatedly declined
to promise to fire consultants who have passed bribes for the company. Wall St. J., June
9, 1976, at 1, col: 1 (Eastern ed.).
9. Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 8 (testimony of Roderick
Hills, Chairman, SEC); SEC REPORT, supra note 3, exhibit A at 2, 3, 7; Wall St. J., Mar.
3, 1976, at 3, col. 2 (Eastern ed.).
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ties."0 After a brief review of the relevant domestic and foreign law, the
Note will examine the criminal legislation which has been introduced
in Congress. The effectiveness of these criminal sanctions, together with
the problems inherent in such an approach, will then be assessed in light
of the alternative remedies available. Finally, several modifications of
the proposed criminal laws will be suggested.
EXISTING BRIBERY LAW
A. CURRENT UNITED STATES LAW
No current federal law directly prohibits American corporations from
offering bribes to foreign officials or making contributions to foreign
political campaigns." In some instances, however, civil or criminal pen-
alties may arise incidentally from such practices.
One area of potential liability involves the false reporting of question-
able payments. Firms conducting business under the Foreign Assistance
Act 2 are required to report all commissions connected with these sales
to the Agency for International Development. Sales of all military goods
abroad are governed by the recently enacted International Security As-
sistance and Arms Export Control Act.13 The Act empowers the Secre-
tary of State to issue regulations requiring that fees, political contribu-
tions, and gifts made in connection with governmental or commercial
arms sales be disclosed to the Secretary and selected congressional com-
mittees and government agencies.'4 In addition, companies dealing with
buyers financing their purchases with loans from the Export-Import
Bank of the United States must report all commissions included in the
contract price to this federal agency. Deliberate falsification of these
reports in order to hide any questionable payments may violate 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1966).15
10. See note 3 supra. Commercial bribery and payments to lower level government
employees will be mentioned only incidentally.
11. Silk, To Bribe or Bribe Not, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1976, at 39, col. 5 (city ed.); Task
Force Letter, supra note 3, at 10; Wall St. J., June 15, 1976, at 3, col. 2 (Eastern ed.);
Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7, col. 1. (Eastern ed.). Compare the federal sanctions for
similar payments to United States government officials, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), or for
corporate contributions to domestic political campaigns, 18 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
12. 22 U.S.C. § 2399 (1970).
13. Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976).
14. Id. at § 604(b).
15. Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 11-12; Silk, To Bribe or Bribe Not, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1976, at 39, col. 6 (city ed.). 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1966) provides in part that
"whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department. . . of the United
States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
1977]
Cornell International Law Journal
Firms with registered securities must meet additional reporting re-
quirements. Although there is no specific requirement that payments to
foreign officials or political parties be disclosed in registration state-
ments or annual reports, the Securities and Exchange Commission re-
quires the reporting of all information "material" to the purchasing
decision of the prudent investor." The willful failure to report a ques-
tionable payment, if "material," arguably constitutes criminal fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1966).11
The Internal Revenue Code constitutes a further source of potential
liability. Section 162(c)(1) of the code prohibits deductions "for any
payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official or employee of any
government. . . if. . . the payment would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States if such laws were applicable to such payments and
to such official or employee."" Persons who knowingly take an improper
deduction are subject to civil and criminal penalties.'"
Other possible collateral violations of the criminal code include con-
spiracy,2° mail fraud,' fraud by wire, 2 and conspiracy to defraud the
or representations, or [knowingly] makes or uses any false writing or document ... shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." It was
established in United States v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 368 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.
1966), that the concealment of improper payments in AID reports violated 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1966). The Criminal Fraud Section of the Export-Import Bank is reportedly investi-
gating several alleged cases of false reporting. Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 11.
16. The SEC's use of the materiality doctrine is examined in note 62 infra.
17. Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 12.
18. In addition, § 162(c)(2) prohibits deductions for payments to any person "if the
payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other illegal payment ... under
any law of a State (but only if such State law is generally enforced), which subjects the
payer to criminal penalty or loss of license ...... In light of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)
(5) this section appears not to be limited to payments within the United States but would
apply with equal force to payments abroad.
Three provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 should also aid in discouraging foreign
bribery by making such payments more expensive for a corporation and its shareholders.
Section 1065(a)(1) of the Act amends I.R.C. § 952(a) to include "the sum of the amounts
of any illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments (within the meaning of section 162(c))
paid by or on behalf of the corporation. . . directly or indirectly to an official, employee,
or agent in fact of a government" in the subpart (f) income of controlled foreign corpora-
tions. Similarly, section 1065(a)(2) amends I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(D) to provide that such
payments made by DISCs will be deemed a "distribution in taxable years" and thus
taxable as a dividend to all shareholders on a pro-rata basis. The third provision, section
1065(b) of the Tax Reform Act, amends I.R.C. § 964(a) so as to exclude § 162(c) payments
when calculating the earnings and profits of foreign corporations.
19. See Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
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United States." It has also been suggested that such conduct might
violate 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1966), which prohibits American citizens from
attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence the conduct of a foreign
government in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United
States.?
The ineffectiveness of present domestic law is evidenced by the cur-
rent corporate payments problem. Moreover, because of the limited
scope of existing regulations, it is unlikely that even the most vigorous
enforcement of these laws would effectively deter future misconduct.2
B. FOREIGN LAW
Bribery of government officials is expressly prohibited in virtually all
countries. 8 However, it is often difficult to determine exactly what con-
23. 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1970).
24. Metcalf Letter, supra note 7, at 5.
25. Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 13.
26. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 65
(testimony of Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy); id. at 103 (testimony
of Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce); Bar of the City of New York Report, supra
note 4, at 25. See House Hearings on OPIC, supra note 4, at 5, which lists the bribery
laws of OPIC countries as follows:
BRIBERY LAWS OF OPIC COUNTRIES
COUNTRIES WITH LAWS PENALIZING FOR LESS THAN 5 YEARS
Barbados Iran St. Lucia
Burundi Israel Saudi Arabia
Chile Jamaica Senegal (3)
Dominican Republic Jordan Sierra Leone (5)
Ethiopia Liberia Sudan (5)
Greece Morocco Tanzania (3)
Guatemala Nicaragua Togo (5)
Guyana Pakistan Western Samoa (3)
Honduras Paraguay Zaire (3)
India Philippines Zambia (3)
[The numbers in parentheses indicate the maximum penalty in years.]
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stitutes a "bribe" under the laws of a particular country., Several gener-
alizations, nevertheless, can be made. Payments to obtain or maintain
government business clearly constitute bribes. John J. McCloy, Chair-
man of the Gulf Oil Special Review Committee which investigated ques-
tionable payments made by this major multinational, testified before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs that the
Gulf Committee "could not identify a single country where a bribe of a
government official to induce a government to enter into a contract with
any company for the supply of its product to that government was not
illegal in that country."2' In addition, payoffs made to influence the
passage or retention of favorable legislation likely fall within the defini-
tion of an illegal bribe in a large number of countries.2 1 With respect to
other types of questionable payments, there is no consensus on what
conduct is prohibited under foreign law.3" In any event, the prosecution
PENALTIES OF GREATER THAN 6 TO 10 YEARS
Argentina Haiti Singapore (7)
Bolivia Indonesia Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (7)
Brazil Ivory Coast Swaziland (7)
Cameroon Kenya Trinidad and Tobago (7)
China Korea Tunisia (10)
Colombia Laos Turkey (10)
Costa Rica Malagasy Republic Upper Volta (10)
Ecuador Malaysia Venezuela (8)
Egypt Mali Yemen Arab Republic (10)
El Salvador Nigeria Yugoslavia (10)
Grenada Panama
Guinea Romania
PENALTY OF 26 YEARS
Thailand
27. See Senate Hearings on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 14, 15, 17. Roderick
Hills, Chairman of the SEC, testified:
I do not think [that any government agency in the country has] the capacity to
decide what is or is not legal under foreign laws. I hate to say how many file
cabinets of my former law firm were filled with opinions expressing no opinion as
to whether a given transaction was legal or illegal.
Id. at 14. See also Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 6
(testimony of John McCloy).
28. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 6.
29. For instance, the criminal codes of Japan and Korea, two countries involved in
recent disclosures, prohibit bribes to officials "in connection with [the official's] duties."
The Penal Code of Japan, Articles 197-98 (1973), EmuN-HoRIu-SHA LAW BULLEnN SERIES,
JAP, VOL. II (1973); The Criminal Code of Korea, Chapter VII, Article 133 (1969), LAw
OF THE REPUBIc OF KoRm, (Korean Legal Center trans. 2d ed. 1969).
30. See note 27 supra.
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of American nationals under foreign anti-bribery law has been very
rare.'
In contrast to the almost universal prohibition on bribery of govern-
ment officials, corporate contributions to political campaigns are legal
in many, if not most, countries.2 For example, Canada and the United
Kingdom permit such contributions and even offer them confidential
treatment. Corporate financing of political campaigns is also a regular
practice in Japan34 and Italy. 5 In addition to recognizing political con-
tributions by corporations, German law provides that such donations
are deductible as business expenses for tax purposes."8
II
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
During the 94th Congress, three bills were introduced which would
prohibit corporate payments to foreign officials and restrict contribu-
tions to foreign political parties. Although none of the bills were
enacted and all expired with the end of the 94th Congress,37 one of the
31. See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings
on MNCs] (testimony of Mark Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State).
One of the reasons suggested for the lack of enforcement is that the countries in which
the bribes are paid do not have access to the information needed to successfully prosecute.
Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 9 (comments of Sen.
William Proxmire). Similarly, lack of information might hamper criminal prosecution by
United States law enforcement agencies. See notes 96-105 infra and accompanying text.
32. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1976, at 46, col. 2; Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate
Bribes, supra note 5, at 5-6. During the hearings John McCloy expressed his belief that it
would "take comparatively little research to disclose that the absolute prohibition of
corporate political contributions is a rather unique phenomenon of American political
history." Id. at 6.
33. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 103 (testimony
of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury). See id. at 12 (testimony of John McCloy);
N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1976, at 46, col. 2 (city ed.); Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 6
(Eastern ed.).
34. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1976, at 8, col. 1 (city ed.).
35. Wall St. J., May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.); id. at 2, col. 2.
36. Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1976, at 28, col. 2 (Eastern ed.).
37. Neither H.R. 7539 nor S. 3133 were reported out of Committee. S. 3664 was voted
on and passed by the Senate 86-0. 122 CONG. REC. S15862 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976). At
the time of the vote it appeared that the House would not have time to act within the
remaining two weeks before adjournment, and a proposal to attach the bill to a minor
House-Senate conference group which would have increased the chances of enactment was
rejected. Id.; Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
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proposals has been reintroduced in the 95th Congress."
The first anti-bribery proposal of the 94th Congress was H.R. 7539,
which provided that anyone affiliated with an American company "who,
with intent to influence any official act affecting such company, gives
or attempts. . . to give any thing of value to any foreign government,
any foreign official, or any foreign political organization, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."' ,
Under this bill, the Secretary of State would be responsible for monitor-
ing the foreign activities of American multinationals and reporting all
questionable practices to the Department of Justice."
Sponsored by Senator Proxmire, the first Senate bill to be introduced,
S. 3133, would prohibit bribes through an amendment to the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934,41 and therefore would apply only to firms
with registered securities. This bill, like H.R. 7539, would prohibit the
offering of money or anything of value to foreign officials and foreign
political parties and, in addition, would impose criminal penalties for
making payments to any person when the payor knows, or has reason
to know, that a portion of the payment will be passed on to a govern-
ment official.4" This latter provision was designed to restrict the appar-
ently common use of sales agents as conduits for bribes, 3 a problem
which the House proposal failed to address." S. 3133 contains three
other provisions which distinguish it from H.R. 7539. First, the Proxmire
proposal would empower the Securities and Exchange Commission to
issue new rules and regulations requiring firms with registered securities
to maintain more accurate records. 5 Second, it would incorporate for-
38. S. 3664 was reintroduced in the 95th Congress as S. 305. See note 49 infra.
39. H.R. 7539, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1976).
40. Id. at § 1.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a -78hh (1970). Only 9,000 of the approximately 30,000 American
companies trading abrdad regularly file with the SEC. Task Force Letter, supra note 3,
at 15; Wall St. J., June 7, 1976, at 11, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
42. S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976). The bill would not cover contributions to
political parties made through intermediaries.
43. The ultimate recipient of the bribe in some cases may be known only to the foreign
sales agent who includes these payments in his fee. Twenty-nine of the ninety.five corpo-
rations reporting to the SEC disclosed the use of foreign sales-type commissions. The SEC
concluded that in many instances portions of these unusual sales commissions found their
way into the hands of foreign officials. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 38-39.
44. During the Senate Hearings, Ralph Nader expressed his concern over multination-
als circumventing anti-bribery law through the use of an elaborate system of intermedi-
aries. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 21.
45. Section 1 provides that the Securities and Exchange Commission "shall... require
issuers of securities ... to maintain accurate books, records, or accounts of all transac-
tions in such form and containing such information as the Commission deems necessary
to carry out its enforcement responsibilities under this title."
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eign bribery law, making a violation of foreign law punishable in the
United States.46 Third, and most importantly, the bill would require
that all issuers of registered securities report to the SEC any payment
in excess of one thousand dollars made to any foreign official, political
party, or sales agent, regardless of its legality. The reports would include
the amount of the payment, the name of the recipient, and the purpose
of the payment, and would be made public immediately. 7 The SEC
would be solely responsible for the investigation and prosecution of any
violation of the proposed law. 8
After several hearings on S. 3133, Senator Proxmire introduced a
second bill, S. 3664, which responded to much of the criticism directed
at his first proposal. This bill has been reintroduced in the 95th Congress
as S. 305.11 S. 305 drops the disclosure requirement of S. 31330 and
expands the application of the anti-bribery provisions to all American
businesses and citizens. Specifically, the bill would make it unlawful for
any individual or business concern to "corruptly" offer, pay, promise to
pay, or authorize the payment of money or anything of value, directly
or through an intermediary, to any foreign official, government agency,
political party, or candidate for office. The prohibition would apply
46. Section 3 makes it "unlawful for any issuer of a [registered security to] . . . pay
or agree to pay any money or give or agree to give any thing of value in a manner or for a
purpose which is illegal under the laws of a foreign government having jurisdiction over
the transaction."
47. S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1976).
48. Id. at § 4.
49. S. 3664 was combined with a previous bill dealing with disclosure of foreign invest-
ment in the United States. The combined legislation was entitled "Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1977." Title I of the proposal
incorporated S. 3664. S. 305 was passed by the Senate by voice vote on May 5, 1977. 123
CONG. REc. S7195 (daily ed. May 5, 1977). At the time this Note went to press neither S.
305 nor H.R. 3815, its House counterpart, had been reported out of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
50. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in their report on
S. 3664 stated that the retention of the disclosure provision would be beneficial in
"deterring those payments which are dubious in purpose but which may not meet the bill's
definition of an illegal bribe." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
CoRRupr OVERSEAS PAYMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESs ETrEPIRsEs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976)
(Report No. 94-1031) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT ON S. 3664]. Unsure
whether this benefit was outweighed by the administrative costs of the provision, the
Committee postponed final decision on the disclosure requirement. Id. The President's
Task Force rejected a disclosure-plus-criminalization plan as being inherently incom-
patible. Task Force Letter, supra note 3. at 23.
51. S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 104 (1977). The word "corruptly" was used in
the bill to indicate an intent or desire to influence the recipient to misuse his official
position. The Committee Report states that "corruptly" is to be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the case law defining this word in 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970), which deals
with domestic bribery. COMMrrrEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 7.
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only when the payment was made to induce the recipient to use his
position to channel business to any person or influence the legislation
or regulations of any foreign government."
The Securities and Exchange Commission would be responsible for
investigating and bringing civil actions against corporations with regis-
tered securities. Cases would be referred to the Department of Justice
for criminal prosecution.53 Firms not subject to the securities laws would
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Justice
which would both investigate and prosecute alleged violations." In addi-
tion, S. 305 would impose more extensive corporate accounting require-
ments through an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11
while eliminating the provision incorporating foreign bribery law.5"
Of the three proposals, S. 305 is the most well-reasoned. To be effec-
tive, anti-bribery law should apply to all persons and businesses trading
abroad and should restrict the use of sales agents as conduits for payoffs.
Only S. 305 fulfills both requirements. This bill also imposes the most
stringent accounting standards which should further deter bribery by
52. S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 104 (1977). The language of the bill was
narrowly drawn to exclude low level facilitating bribes made to expedite the performance
of routine government services. The regulation of such payments by the United States was
thought to be infeasible. COMMrrrEE REPORT ON S-3664, supra note 50, at 6, 7. The bill
would also not reach commercial bribery.
53. CommnrEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 3. Rather than place full responsi-
bility on the Department of Justice, the Committee believed that authorizing the SEC to
investigate corporations already reporting to the agency would avoid costly duplication
of effort. SEC investigation of bribes would continue regardless of the criminal penalties
for such conduct since bribes would often be "material" to the investor. Id. at 10. Some
commentators feel that all investigative and enforcement powers should be vested in a
single agency. See Bar of the City of New York Report, supra note 4, at 31.
54. CommrrrEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 3.
55. S. 305 incorporates verbatim the SEC's proposed accounting standards which were
introduced in the 94th Congress as a separate bill, S. 3418. The Proxmire legislation
provides, in part, that all firms with registered securities shall:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that. . . transactions are executed in
accordance with management's general or specific authorization ....
S. 305, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1977). The SEC has proposed several amendments to
rules and schedules which would accomplish the objectives of its legislative proposal. SEC
Release No. 34-13185 (reprinted in BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 387 (1977), at El-ES).
56. "[To try to impose on any governmental agency in this country . . . the job of
trying to interpret all foreign laws and ferret out all the law enforcement problems of the
world would [be] a burden almost beyond [the] capacity of our Government to meet."
Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 17 (testimony of Roderick Hill,
Chairman, SEC).
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facilitating the enforcement of the anti-bribery sections of the bill.5 7
Furthermore, the proposal wisely places responsibility for all criminal
prosecution on the Department of Justice, relieving the SEC of a task
which may be beyond its proper scope of duty. 8
B. OTHER PROPOSAL
Of the various other alternatives for controlling foreign payments,
disclosure and international agreements are the most viable.59 Disclo-
sure has been the primary weapon employed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Under the securities laws, corporations are re-
quired to provide registration statements and periodic reports to the
SEC containing specified information." In addition to the specified
57. Foreign payoffs are often accompanied by questionable accounting procedures de-
signed to conceal the generation of funds with which to make questionable payments or
to hide the diversion of existing corporate assets. See Corporate Payments, supra note 4,
at 553-58. During the floor debates, Senator Proxmire explained that the purpose of the
accounting standards provision was "to make sure that the management of a company
controls its assets, and that if people representing the company make a bribe payment
[it will be] possible to hold the top officials of the company responsible." 122 CONG. REc.
S15789 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976).
58. See, Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 15 (testi-
mony of John McCloy); Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 25 (testi-
mony of Roderick Hills, Chairman, SEC); Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 28; Lowen-
fels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 19 (1976).
59. Other possible means of controlling corporate payments include:
(a) Tax Laws. Section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits deductions
for bribes and kickbacks. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. The IRS
could require the reporting of all suspect payments, but because of the confiden-
tiality of tax records, this information could not be disclosed to the public. Task
Force Letter, supra note 3, at 14. Furthermore, the IRS would be powerless to
regulate foreign bribes where the payments were properly reported and no im-
proper tax benefits were taken. Id. But see Bar of the City of New York Report,
supra note 4, at 23.
(b) Trade Laws. Antitrust laws are generally inapplicable to foreign bribes. Id.
at 10. See House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 88-95 (testimony of Donald
Baker, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice). Nevertheless,
where bribery affects the sales of another American firm, the payment could be
prohibited under 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), which empowers the Federal Trade Com-
mission to declare certain practices unfair methods of competition. Metcalf Let-
ter, supra note 7, at 7. Bribes which did not harm the sales of American competi-
tors could not be reached.
(c) Corporate Codes of Conduct. Many firms have responded to disclosures of
corporate misconduct by issuing ethical codes to be followed by their employees.
SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. Self policing, however desirable, is not a viable
solution. See Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at
21 (testimony of Ralph Nader); N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1975, at 45, col. 6.
60. Schedule A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a -77aa (1970), specifies
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items, the rules promulgated by the Commission require the disclosure
of all "material" information in order to prevent other items from being
misleading."' Because questionable payments are often deemed to be
"material," 2 over three hundred corporations have disclosed such pay-
ments through the SEC's voluntary disclosure program or as a result of
Commission enforcement action. 3
A broader disclosure scheme which would apply to all persons and
businesses, not only to corporations with registered securities, has been
recommended by the President's Task Force on Questionable Corporate
Payments Abroad. The proposal, which was introduced in the 94th Con-
gress as S. 3741,4 states:
A person shall report to the Secretary [of Commerce] . .. payments
hereafter made on behalf of the person or the person's foreign affiliate
to any other individual or entity in connection with an official action, or
sale to or contract with a foreign government, for the commercial benefit
of the person or his foreign affiliate.6
The report would include the name of the recipient and the amount of
the payment 6 and would be made public after one year unless the Secre-
tary of State made a specific determination in writing that foreign policy
considerations dictated against disclosure." The Secretary of Commerce
the information required in a registration statement and empowers the Commission to
modify these requirements. The continuous reporting system is based on the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a -78hh (1970).
61. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.405.1 (1975); 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1975); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1975); 17 C.F.R. § 140.12b-20 (1975); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a.9 (1975).
62. In most instances the SEC has held questionable payments "material" on one of
four grounds. First, such practices are often accompanied by inaccurate record keeping.
Improper accounting practices provide an independent basis for holding the transaction
"material." Second, a payment must be reported if it is significant in amount or related
to a significant portion of revenue. The third basis involves matters of improper exercise
of corporate authority and quality of management. Finally, a payment is "material" if it
might cause repercussions of an unknown nature. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-13. See
generally Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the
Securities Acts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1848 (1976); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities
Acts'Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1976); Mann, Watergate to Banan-
agate: What Lies Beyond?, 31 Bus. LAw. 1663 (1976).
63. See note 2 supra. The voluntary disclosure program is thoroughly examined in
SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-15.
64. S. 3741 was never reported out of committee.
65. S. 3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976).
66. Id. at § 9(a).
67. Id. at § 8. The Attorney General could also prevent disclosure if the payment were
the subject of an ongoing investigation or prosecution. Id. Compare S. 3133 which contains
no provision for delaying disclosure to the public. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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would be empowered to exempt certain payments from the reporting
requirements."
A second possibile alternative to the unilateral criminal prohibition
of bribery is the negotiation of an international agreement on the con-
duct of multinational corporations. Two of the most promising codes are
the United States proposal to the United Nations Commission on Trans-
national Enterprises69 and the guidelines developed by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD code provides
in part:
Enterprises should
7. not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to ren-
der-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public
servant or holder of public office;
8. unless legally permissibile, not make contributions to candidates for
public office or to political parties or other political organizations;
9. abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities
70
Already the Senate has passed a resolution supporting an international
solution to ihe bribery problem, and this alternative has also received
support in the House.7
III
POLICY ISSUES
During the congressional hearings on the proposed anti-bribery laws,
three major issues were repeatedly raised: was bribery a competitive
necessity in world trade; would the extraterritorial application of United
States law have an adverse effect on foreign relations; and could an anti-
bribery scheme be effectively enforced? The proposed criminal legisla-
tion will be examined along these three lines of inquiry and then the
alternatives of disclosure and international codes will be explored.
68. S. 3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a)(3) (1976).
69. 61 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 37-38, U.N. Doc. E/5782-E/c.10/16 (1976).
70. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTmmSFs 13 (1976) (OECD Publication); N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
71. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), states in part:
Resolved, That the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the United
States Representative to the United Nations, and appropriate officials of the
Department of State, Commerce, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Justice
* * * initiate at once negotiations ... with the intent of developing an appropri-
ate code of conduct . . . which would result in elimination of [questionable
corporate] practices on an international, multilateral basis ....
See H.R. Res. 941, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
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A. COMPETrIVE NECESSITY
One of the major arguments against unilaterally prohibiting bribes to
foreign officials or restricting corporate contributions to foreign political
parties is that such legislation would place United States firms at a
competitive disadvantage, resulting in lost foreign trade and fewer
American jobs.72 Of course this problem is not unique to regulation
through criminal sanctions; but would apply equally to the unilateral
imposition of any method of regulation which effectively eliminated
bribery.73 Some argue, therefore, that neither criminal sanctions nor an
effective disclosure program should be enacted until an international
agreement providing for regulation among all the major trading nations
is negotiated."
While this argument at first appears persuasive, its premise of lost
United States trade is a much debated issue. Although many business-
men claim that bribes are an accepted trade custom and that any re-
straint on bribery would shift American sales to foreign competitors who
continued to make payoffs,75 these statements are often anecdotal and
72. An additional argument, closely related to competitive necessity, is that bribery is
an accepted practice abroad. See, e.g., Note, Securities Regulation, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 428,
434 (1976); Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.) ("[S]uch practices are
so deeply engrained in political and business life in many countries ... that only the few
who get caught are likely to give them up altogether." Quoting an unnamed analyst); Wall
St. J., Apr. 14, 1976, at 15, col. 1 (Eastern ed.) ("Payments are required [in the Mideast].
It is considered politically benevolent by the'rulers of those countries for companies to
distribute money." Quoting William Wearly, Chairman, Ingersoll-Rand Co.). Although
so-called "grease" bribes to lower level employees may be an accepted custom in some
parts of the world, payoffs to top officials are undoubtedly not. One writer has analyzed
this argument as follows:
Some corporate executives contend that it is both unfair and unwise for the
Government to crack down on bribery abroad by Americans. Their defense is
essentially the "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" argument. This argument
actually goes back to the ancient Greek Skeptics, disciples of Pyrrho, who asserted
that there could never be any rational ground for perferring one course of action
over another and that the task of man is simply to conform to the customs of the
country where he lives or works. Some businessmen appear to follow the doctrines
of the ancient Cynics, disciples of Diogenes, who held that man's life in society is
inherently bad and that one can find satisfaction only in unresisting resignation
to the world's evils.
Silk, To Bribe or Bribe Not, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1976, at 39, col. 5 (city ed.).
73. See Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 64 (testi-
mony of Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy).
74. See, e.g., id. at 53 (statement of Ian MacGregor, Chairman, United States Council
of the International Chamber of Commerce); Solomon & Linville, Transnational Conduct
of American Multinational Corporations: Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B. C. INDUS.
& COMM. L. REv. 303, 338 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Questionable Payments Abroad].
75. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 59
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exaggerated.7" The most reliable information on the impact of unilateral
action on foreign trade is the SEC's Report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices." Of the seventy companies listed as
involved in questionable foreign transactions, sixteen specifically noted
in their reports to the Commission that cessation of these practices
would have no material effect on total revenues, while only three indi-
cated that payoffs might have to be made in the future to maintain
sales.7" Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the SEC, has stated that the
Commission has found "in every industry where bribes have been re-
vealed that companies of- equal size are proclaiming that they see no
need to engage in such practices."" The investigation of the President's
Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad similarly sup-
ports the view that bribes play an insignificant role in foreign trade.
Two major factors mitigate against any loss of trade due to unilateral
regulation. First, in many product areas, only American firms compete
for sales abroad. Therefore, if any trade distortion occurred, it would
consist merely of a sales redistribution among American companies,
having no overall effect on the United States balance of trade.' Second,
since bribes frequently do not reach the intended governmental recipi-
ent, their bearing on purchasing decisions is at best conjecture.2 Senator
Proxmire has gone so far as to suggest that anti-bribery laws would
create a United States trade advantage as American firms would de-
(testimony of Ian MacGregor, Chairman, United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 48, col. 3 (city ed.) (statement of
Robert Haack, Chairman, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.); Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1976, at 18, col.
6 (Eastern ed.); Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.).
76. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 59-61;
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 48, col. 3 (city ed.).
77. SEC REPORT, supra note 3.
78. Figures computed from Exhibit A of SEC REPoRT, supra note 3. Many of the compa-
nies reporting that the cessation of bribery would not materially affect sales are not within
high technology industries which have little foreign competition. Rather, they are within
industries whose products may be readily duplicated by foreign competitors.
79. Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 4. See Senate Hearings on
Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 1 (comments of Sen. William Proxmire).
80. Wall St. J., June 15, 1976, at 3, col. 3 (Eastern ed.); Task Force Letter, supra note
3, at 4.
81. 122 CONG. Rc. S15790 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976); Senate Hearings on Foreign and
Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 45 (testimony of George Ball, former Under Secretary
of State); Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 4.
82. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 39 (testimony
of George Ball, former Under Secretary of State); Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 4.
For example, Adnan Khashoggi, a well-known sales agent in the Middle East, retained
the $450,000 given to him by Northrop Corp. to pass on to two Saudi air force generals.
T M, Feb. 23, 1976, at 33, col. 1.
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velop the reputation of winning contracts solely on the basis of product
quality and price.3
Certainly, some foreign business opportunities would be lost by the
unilateral enactment of criminal bribery laws. The more complete stud-
ies, however, indicate that potential trade losses would be small, if not
insignificant.
B. 'FOREIGN RELATIONS
The extraterritorial application of United States law involves numer-
ous foreign relations considerations." For example, such action might be
viewed as an arrogant attempt by the United States to protect a foreign
nation from its own corrupt officials. Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal
Advisor for the Department of State, has argued that "[i]t would be
not only presumptuous but counterproductive to seek to impose our
specific standards in countries with differing histories and cultures."5
The State Department, Feldman indicated, "would be opposed to any
legislation that would be directed to the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad
in their relations with foreign officials which is based on the general
proposition that U.S. citizens should behave well abroad."' ,
With regard to discouraging bribery of foreign government officials,
it seems unlikely that the proposed anti-bribery laws would be viewed
as an imposition of a conflicting moral code."7 Given that bribery is
illegal in almost all countries, coupled with the concern voiced abroad
over the corrupting influence of American multinationals, a substantial
number of countries would undoubtedly favor American efforts to curb
such conduct.8 Measures to prevent such practices should engender
83. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 63.
84. A United Nations study recommends against the extraterritorial application of law
and concludes that a multinational corporation, with few exceptions, should be governed
solely by the laws of the host country. Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study
the Role of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations, U.N.
Document E/5500Add.1 (part 1) (1974) (reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATEmALS 800, 826,
829).
85. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 24. See Note, Securities Regulations,
49 TEMP. L.Q. 428, 434 (1976).
86. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 26.
87. The disclosure of corporate bribery in Japan and the Netherlands stirred public
outrage and precipitated government investigations into the incidents. See, e.g., Wash.
Star, Feb. 9, 1976, § A, at 5, col. 1; Wash. Star, Feb. 19, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 1.
88. See 122 CONG. REc. 815790 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976). One of the reasons that an
anti-bribery law would be welcomed abroad is that such payments rarely benefit the
foreign nation. Payoffs to obtain sales result in the purchasing country either acquiring
an inferior product or paying a higher price to cover the cost of the bribe. Id.; Gwirtzman,
Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 110, col. 5. Any
attempt to prohibit "grease" payments would be viewed with less favor.
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good will among the leaders of reform movements in developing coun-
tries." The Attorney General of the African Republic of Botswana, M.D.
Mokama, has stated:
Certainly, no self-respecting African nation would consider U.S. legisla-
tion aimed at curbing corrupt practices of American transnational enter-
prises in their foreign host state to be "presumptuous" or in any way "an
interference." On the contrary, most Third World nations would appre-
ciate such legislation.9'
It has also been suggested that unilateral action restricting a multina-
tional's ability to contribute to foreign political parties would create
serious foreign relations problems. 1 However, in all three proposals ille-
gality is contingent upon a nexus between the contribution and commer-
cially favorable treatment by the government.92 Although some corrupt
regimes may be offended by such a statutory formulation, it is reason-
able to assume that many nations would welcome efforts to end pay-
ments that are political contributions in form and bribes in substance.
A further consideration is the effect the unilateral enactment of a
criminal anti-bribery law would have on the development of interna-
tional codes. William Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury, has
expressed concern "that a unilateral effort like that involved in S. 3133
[or presumably H.R. 7539 or S. 305] would undercut the vital principle
that co-operative action by the whole community of nations is needed
in order to deal effectively with this problem."" Although the United
States must carefully avoid the appearance of seeking to impose its
specific legal standards on the rest of the world, compelling reasons exist
for cautiously proceeding with the enactment of domestic laws. Accord-
ing to George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, only after "we have
put our own house in order" will we be entitled to insist that other
governments do likewise. 4 Unilateral action by the United States, the
domicile of most of the world's powerful multinationals, would prove its
commitment to solving the corporate payments problem, provide an
example for other nations to follow, and permit America's representa-
89. Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National Responsibility, 62
A.B.A.J. 480, 481 (1976).
90. COMmTrEE REPoirr ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 4-5. Corrupt regimes, of course,
would favor American inaction.
91. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 12
(testimony of John McCloy).
92. H.R. 7539, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1976); S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976);
S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 104(a)(2) (1977).
93. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 88. See id. at
70 (testimony of Leonard Meeker, Center for Law and Social Policy).
94. Id. at 41.
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tives to speak with authority in the development of an international
agreement."
C. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The most difficult problem with any proposal to regulate corporate
activities abroad is that of administration and enforcement." With re-
gard to criminal anti-bribery laws, the main obstacle is gathering suffi-
cient evidence to meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.97
It is generally recognized that no principle of international law com-
pels a foreign country to provide judicial assistance in criminal mat-
ters.9" In some instances local law may actually prohibit the disclosure
of certain information." However, even if local law provides for interna-
tional cooperation in criminal prosecutions, this merely empowers and
does not compel foreign authorities to offer assistance.' Furthermore,
a substantial number of the current international agreements providing
for judicial assistance contain "ordre-public" clauses or interest clauses
which permit noncooperation where judicial assistance might seriously
harm the political, economic, or military stability of the requested na-
tion. ' Any future agreement on judicial assistance would likely include
a similar interest clause loophole,' and furnishing information on ques-
tionable corporate payments would certainly fall within this exception.
Although information exchange is discretionary, there are indications
that judicial assistance would be afforded in some instances. The SEC
95. Id. See also id. at 112 (comments of Sen. William Proxmire).
96. The enactment of an anti-bribery law governing transactions abroad would clearly
be within the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. At least three jurisdictional
theories support such action. First, under the territorial principle, a nation may regulate
conduct within its territory whether or not the effect of the conduct falls within the
territory. Second, a nation may regulate conduct outside its territory if the conduct is
generally recognized as a crime and has foreseeable and substantial effects within the
nation's territorial limits. Third, a country may regulate the activities of its nationals
regardless of where that activity takes place. CoMMrrrFE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note
50, at 15. See Bar of the City of New York Report, supra note 4, at 6, 46 n.4. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAw OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 2
(1965); Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdiction and Their Application, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.
1 (1976).
97. Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 22-23; CoMMrrrEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note
50, at 17.
98. 2 M. BAssIouNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 234 (1973).
99. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 69 (testimony of Philip Loomis, Jr.,
Commissioner, SEC).
100. BASSIouNI & NANDA, supra note 98, at 234.
101. Id. at 237-38.
102. Cf. id. at 237.
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has received remarkable international cooperation from a number of
countries," 3 and other nations have stated their willingness to cooperate
to the fullest extent possible to ensure the prosecution of offending mul-
tinationals. °4 In addition, the SEC has found information gathered from
domestic records, ethically-minded employees, and competitors suffi-
cient to bring numerous enforcement actions, and these sources would
also be available for the enforcement of criminal sanctons.10 5
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL SANcTIONS, DISCLOSURE, AND
INTERNATIONAL CODES
To effectively appraise the merits and drawbacks of criminal sanc-
tions, the alternative remedies must be evaluated. As with criminal
anti-bribery law, the regulation of foreign payments through disclosure
poses problems of administration, foreign relations, and lost trade. Reli-
ance upon international agreements also presents serious difficulties.
One of the disadvantages of a general disclosure scheme, suci as that
found in S. 3133, is the administrative burden involved in receiving,
filing, and examining reports on all fees and commissions paid in
connection with sales abroad. 106 Furthermore, if all payments were dis-
closed, the reports might be rendered largely meaningless due to their
sheer volume. Concern over general disclosure also stems from the fact
that the publication of all payments regardless of their legality would
expose a company's method of operation abroad, often a highly valued
competitive tool." ' All of these problems, however, would be minimized
by a disclosure plan, such as that found in S. 3741, which exempts many
routine business payments ' and delays the release of all information to
the public for one year.0 9
Assuming that both criminal sanctions and disclosure could.be effec-
tively enforced, the criminal approach offers greater promise of long-
103. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 69 (testimony of Philip Loomis, Jr.,
Commissioner, SEC).
104. CoMMrrrEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 4 (statement of M.D. Mokama).
105. Id. at 5.
106. See Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 12 (testimony of John
Evans, Commissioner, SEC); Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra
note 5, at 88 (testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury); 122 CONG. Rsc.
S15856 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976).
107. See Bar of the City of New York Report, supra note 4, at 16.
108. S. 3741 requires the Secretary of Commerce to issue regulations defining "certain
types of payments which are not required to be reported because they are regular business
payments not inconsistent with the purposes of this Act, or are bona fide payments to a
foreign government, such as taxes or fees paid pursuant to duly promulgated laws, regula-
tions, decrees, or other legal action." S. 3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a)(3) (1976).
109. Id. at § 8(a).
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range deterrence. The deterrent effect of disclosure is "a highly depreci-
able commodity,""' as the adverse publicity surrounding a company's
disclosure rapidly fades with time.' Moreover, as the number of disclos-
ing companies grows, the public focuses less on individual firms and
more on all multinationals as a whole."' This depreciation effect has
already been demonstrated in the past year by the greatly decreasing
press coverage given to each successive disclosure. If the trend contin-
ues, five years from now disclosure will be virtually worthless as a deter-
rent to corporate misconduct. On the other hand, criminal sanctions will
probably retain their effectiveness. Corporate payoffs are crimes of plan-
ning, not of passion; insofar as the benefits and risks are balanced as in
any business decision, criminal sanctions can succeed as a long-term
deterrent."'
The relative long-term values of criminal prohibition and disclosure
must be considered in light of their likely impact on United States
foreign relations. There is no question that the recent disclosures have
been a tremendous setback to American foreign policy. Countries have
expropriated the property of several multinationals;"' relations with our
allies have been strained;' and the heads of friendly governments have
been forced out of office. "6 To the extent that disclosure will not effec-
tively deter future corporate payments, bribery and the attendant ad-
verse publicity abroad will continue under this alternative along with
the current foreign relations complications."' Furthermore, this remedy,
110. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 21 (testimony
of Ralph Nader). But see note 117 infra (coverage in the foreign press).
111. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 21; Senate
Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 3, at 6 (comments of Sen. William Proxmire).
According to Jerry Levinson, Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Multination-
als, it "is completely illusionary to think that anything will change [as a result of the
recent disclosures]." Mr. Levinson states that "once the publicity has faded many of
these guys will go back to the same old philosophy of sell, sell, sell any way you can."
Wall St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.).
112. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 21 (testimony
of Ralph Nader).
113. Metcalf Letter, supra note 7, at 6.
114. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 1.
115. House Hearings on OPIC, supra note 4, at 3-4.
116. House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 22; N.Y. Times, May 11, 1975, § 3,
at 9, col. 5.
117. Recent disclosures have not stopped foreign bribes. See note 8 supra. Although
publicity in the United States will rapidly decrease over time, this may not be the case
abroad. The depreciation effect of adverse publicity is a function of the volume of news
coverage given to the disclosures. Major press coverage in a foreign nation is usually
limited to disclosures involving the particular country's officials, and since such disclo-
sures are relatively infrequent, the impact of such admissions would remain high. Of
course this reasoning is inapplicable to countries with a government-controlled press.
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like criminal prohibition, might possibly be viewed by some countries
as an unjustifiable interference with the internal affairs of a foreign
state."18
Another drawback to a regulatory scheme predicated solely on disclo-
sure of questionable payments is that the impropriety of bribery is left
somewhat in doubt. Criminal sanctions, in contrast, would represent an
unequivocal condemnation of bribery,' 9 and would provide American
businessmen with a strong excuse for resigting extortion pressures. '
Furthermore, with regard to the United States balance of payments,
disclosure may engender a more significant loss in trade than would the
implementation of criminal legislation. If each regulatory scheme
merely eliminated bribery, the two should result in equal trade distor-
tion. However, if disclosure unveils legal payments, foreign firms may
learn the fine points of American salesmanship abroad and thereby gain
a competitive edge in world trade."'
The problems of regulating payments unilaterally would be considera-
bly lessened if an international code were successfully negotiated. But
as Ray Garret, former Chairman of the SEC, has indicated, "[S]uch
an approach while intellectually appealing [is at best] a long range,
and possibly ponderous, route to the resolution of the problems facing
American companies today." '2 It would take years to formulate a stan-
dard of conduct which would be acceptable to the major developed and
developing nations of the world.' 3 In addition, reliance would have to
Under such circumstances, disclosure would not in any way reduce extortion pressures.
118. See Note, Disclosure of Payments to Government Officials Under the Securities
Acts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1848, 1870 n.157 (1976). Arguably, since disclosure legislation
protects a specific United States interest and is not based on a general sense of "Ameican
morality," it would be resented less. But see note 131 infra and accompanying text.
119. "Such legislation would represent the most forceful possible rhetorical assertion
by the President and the Congress of our abhorrence of such conduct. It would place
business executives on clear and unequivocal notice that such practices should stop."
Task Force Letter, supra note 3, at 23.
120. Bob Dorsey, former Chairman of the Gulf Oil Corporation, testified before the
Multinationals Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that having
"such a statute on our books would make it easier to resist the very intense pressures which
are placed on us from time to time. If we could just cite our law which says that we just
may not do it, we would be in a better position to resist these pressures and refuse the
requests." 122 CONG. REC. S15790 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976) (Sen. William Proxmire
quoting Dorsey's testimony). See House Hearings on MNCs, supra note 31, at 75 (testi-
mony of Philip Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, SEC).
121. A limited disclosure plan such as S. 3741 would lessen, but not eliminate, disclo-
sure of trading methods.
122. Address by Ray Garret, Jr., American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (June
27, 1976), at 28, reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. & L. RE. No. 309 (1975), at 61-66.
123. The drafting of an acceptable code would be hampered by the conflicting interests
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be placed on international enforcement machinery which is less depend-
able than that available domestically.'
Because of these drawbacks, international codes could not be exclu-
sively relied upon to meet the pressing problem of foreign payments.
Nevertheless, efforts in this area should be encouraged. International
anti-bribery law could mesh nicely with strong domestic measures,
while reducing the foriegn policy objections and enforcement problems
of unilateral criminal prohibition.
VI
RECOMMENDATIONS
As noted above, S. 305 seems to be the most comprehensive and well-
reasoned anti-bribery proposal.' However, several modifications that
might lessen the problems of regulating corporate payments through
criminal sanctions should be considered.
The sections of the bill dealing with political contributions2 ' should
be restructured to more clearly indicate the intent of the Committee.
Only political contributions made to induce the recipient to misuse his
official position are meant to be prohibited.n The language of the bill
pertaining to political gifts, however, is almost identical to that in S.
3133 1' s which apparently has been misinterpreted by some as prohibiting
all contributions, including those legal under local law.I2 The bill should
make clear that only corrupt political contributions are being attacked.
Alternatively, these subsections should be deleted entirely since the
of developed and developing countries and by the divergent views on the multinational
corporation's appropriate economic, political, and social roles. Questionable Payments
Abroad, supra note 74, at 341.
124. See Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 46 (testi-
mony of George Ball, former Under Secretary of State); id. at 105 (comments of Sen.
William Proxmire). Agreement on an enforcement mechanism could also present prob-
lems. Developing nations might perfer an international body such as an agency of the
United Nations while developed countries might favor direct enforcement through signa-
tory nation-states. An additional problem would be determining what organizational func-
tions any agency should perform. Questionable Payments Aborad, supra note 74, at 342.
125. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
126. S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 104(a)(2) (1977).
127. COMmTTEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 50, at 7.
128. The only significant change is the addition of the word "corruptly" in S. 305. See
note 51 supra and accompanying text.
129. This misreading is indicated by the frequently voiced concern that S. 3133 would
raise foreign relations problems since corporate financing of political campaigns is legal
in many countries. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 5, at 21
(testimony of Ralph Nader). Cf. id. at 6, 12, 103.
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subsections prohibiting bribes through intermediaries' arguably cover
bribes in the form of political contributions.
Adverse foreign reaction might also be diminished by prefacing the
bill with a statement that one of its purposes is to protect domestic cor-
porations from unfair methods of competition in foreign trade. If the
prohibition against bribes is based on this or a similar specific United
States interest, as opposed to general "American morality," there
would be one less ground upon which foreign nations could object. 13'
The difficulty of enforcing criminal sanctions stems primarily from
the degree of proof required. However, providing a civil private right of
action for those competitors harmed by the payoffs would offer a means
of enforcement in those instances where the criminal standard could not
be met. 2
Another modification which would ease enforcement would be the
extension of the record-keeping requirements to all firms. Record-
keeping plays an important role in deterrence and enforcement, 33 but,
as currently drafted, S. 305 imposes strict accounting standards only on
those corporations with registered securities.'34 A provision similar to
that in S. 3741 empowering the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate
record-keeping requirements for those firms beyond the reach of the
SEC should be included in any future anti-bribery legislation.
CONCLUSION
Prohibition through criminal sanction is the best means of dealing
130. S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sass. §§ 103, 104(a)(3) (1977).
131. The objection that criminal anti-bribery law would impose "American morality"
on foreign nations is frequently raised. See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.
132. A private right of action was included in section 10 of S. 3379, a bill which
proposed to regulate bribery through disclosure and strict accounting standards. S. 3379,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). This provision was not included in S. 3664 or S. 305 because
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs considered the language
of section 10 too ambiguous. COMMTs E REPOirr oN S. 3664, supra note 50, at 13. During
the congressional debates on S. 3664, Senator Frank Church offered an amendment which
would have provided, among other things, a private right of action. The amendment
stated in part:
SEc. 5 (a).. . any person who makes any payment prohibited by. .. this Act
• . . and thereby causes a competitor to sustain actual damages is liable to such
competitor in an amount equal to the sum of not more than three times the actual
damages sustained by such competitor, plus the costs of the action and reasonable
attorney's fees . ...
122 CONG. REc. S15792 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976). The amendment was defeated 58-29
largely because of the broad disclosure provision included in the proposal. See id. at
S15792-94 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976); id. at S15855-61 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976).
133. See note 57 supra.
134. S. 305, 95thCong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1977).
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with the problem of corporate bribery in the international setting. Al-
though such an approach might place a few American businesses at a
competitive disadvantage, the overall impact on the United States bal-
ance of payments would be small, if not insignificant. The unilateral
enactment of an anti-bribery law would raise various foreign relations
problems, but those raised by criminal legislation would be no more
substantial than those presented by a disclosure scheme, and certainly
they would be less troublesome than those the United States is currently
experiencing as a result of foreign payoffs. Similarly, the enforcement
of criminal sanctions is achievable, and, although difficult, such en-
forcement is not prohibitively more difficult than the administration of
other proposed remedies.
Criminal anti-bribery law promises to provide the most effective long-
range deterrence to corporate misconduct. Furthermore, criminal sanc-
tions would constitute an unmistakable American condemnation of for-
eign bribery, provide American businessmen with the best conceivable
excuse for resisting extortion, and afford the United States a strong base
from which to negotiate an international bribery agreement.
Judson J. Wambold
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